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I N T E R N AT I O N A L  A R B I T R AT I O N 
Does the New York Convention Allow a Non-Party to an Arbitration  
Agreement to Use Equitable Estoppel to Compel Arbitration? 
CASE AT A GLANCE  
A 1958 treaty, known as the New York Convention, requires countries to give effect to international 
arbitration agreements and awards. In this case, the Court must decide whether the Convention allows a 
non-party to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration by using the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
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INTRODUCTION
In 1958, the United Nations promulgated the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more 
commonly known as the New York Convention. See 330 U.N.T.S. 
38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 7 I.L.M. 1046. Today, 161 countries are parties to 
the Convention, making it one of the most successful commercial 
treaties ever produced.
The United States acceded to the Convention in 1970. To 
implement it, Chapter 2 was added to Title 9 of the United States 
Code. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208.
Prior to the addition of Chapter 2, Title 9 had consisted solely of 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The FAA was passed in 1925 
to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been 
adopted by American courts[.]” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Today, the FAA, as amended, constitutes 
Chapter 1 of Title 9. See 9 U.S.C. Sections 1–16. Chapter 1 applies 
to domestic arbitrations.
Chapter 2 contains a residual application clause (RAC). See 9 
U.S.C. Section 208. It reads as follows: “Chapter 1 applies to 
actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent 
that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention 
as ratified by the United States.”
Thus, when confronted with a case subject to the New York 
Convention, a United States court must consider the Convention; 
Chapter 2 of Title 9; and, to the extent that it does not cause a 
conflict, Chapter 1 of Title 9.
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 545 U.S. 1136 (2005), an 
arbitration agreement is subject to the New York Convention, and 
therefore Chapter 2, if four elements are present:
(1) there is an agreement in writing within the 
meaning of the Convention; (2) the agreement provides 
for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the 
Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is 
considered commercial; and (4) a party to the agreement 
is not an American citizen, or that the commercial 
relationship has some reasonable relation with one or 
more foreign states.
Id. at 1294 n.7.
In the current case, everyone agrees that elements 2 (arbitration 
in a signatory country—here, Germany), 3 (commercial 
transaction—here, the sale of machinery), and 4 (at least one 
non-U.S. citizen—here, a French company) are present. Where 
the sides disagree, and what the Supreme Court must decide, is 
whether element 1 (an agreement in writing) is present.
ISSUE
Does the New York Convention allow a non-party to an arbitration 
agreement to use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel 
arbitration?
FACTS
In May 2007, the German conglomerate Thyssenkrupp AG (TKAG) 
selected Calvert, Alabama, as the site of its new $4.65 billion carbon 
and stainless steel factory. Calvert is a suburb of Mobile, Alabama.
On November 25, 2007, Thyssenkrupp Stainless USA, LLC 
(TKS) TKAG’s United States subsidiary, entered into three 
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contracts—designated 1001, 1002, and 1003—with F.L. Industries, 
Inc. (FLI), a United States subsidiary of the French conglomerate 
Fives SA. Pursuant to the contracts, FLI agreed to supply three cold 
rolling mills (CRMs) to the Calvert factory.
“Rolling” refers to the flattening, shaping, and smoothing of metal 
by passing it through rollers at high pressure. In cold rolling, the 
metal is rolled at room temperature; in hot rolling, the metal is 
heated before being rolled. Cold rolling is both more expensive and 
more labor intensive than hot rolling, but produces pieces that are 
stronger and have a better finish.
The contracts gave FLI the right to subcontract the work but 
specified which subcontractors it could use. See Annex A3 of the 
contracts. On December 18, 2007, FLI entered into a “consortial 
agreement” with Converteam SAS (CT) and DMS SA, two French 
companies that were on the list of approved subcontractors. Under 
the consortial agreement, CT agreed to provide each of the CRMs 
with three motors.
The TKS-FLI contracts required any disputes to be arbitrated in 
Düsseldorf, Germany under German law using the arbitration rules 
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). See Sections 23.1, 
23.2, 23.5 of the contracts. They additionally described TKS as the 
“Buyer,” FLI as the “Seller,” and stated: “When Seller is mentioned 
it shall be understood as Sub-contractors included, except if 
expressly stated otherwise.” See Section 1.2 of the contracts.
The consortial agreement likewise required disputes to be 
arbitrated using the ICC’s rules, but called for the application of 
French law and made Paris the venue for hearings. In addition, 
the consortial agreement provided that if TKS and FLI ended up 
in arbitration, FLI had the right to “join [CT] into the arbitration 
proceedings with [TKS]….”
In 2011, General Electric purchased CT for $3.2 billion. As a result, 
CT’s name was changed to GE Energy Power Conversion France 
SAS, Corp. (GE Energy). In 2012, TKAG sold TKS, along with the 
stainless steel portion of the Calvert factory, to Outokumpu Oyj 
(OO), a Finnish company, for $3.6 billion. As a result, TKS, which 
had been renamed Inoxum prior to the sale, became Outokumpu 
Stainless USA, LLC (OS). In 2013, TKAG sold the carbon steel 
portion of the Calvert factory to Luxembourg’s ArcelorMittal S.A. 
and Japan’s Nippon Steel Corporation for $1.6 billion. In 2014, FLI 
changed its name to Fives St. Corp.
In 2011, CT/GE Energy began delivering the motors to the Calvert 
factory; by 2012, all nine had been installed. In June 2014, the 
motors began to experience problems; by August 2015, all nine had 
failed. As a result, OS suffered $45 million in damages.
On June 10, 2016, OS, its insurer (Sompo Japan Insurance 
Company of America), and OO’s seven insurers (AIG Europe 
Limited, AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance SA UK Branch, HDI 
Gerling UK Branch, MSI Corporate Capital Ltd., Pohjola Insurance 
Limited, Royal & Sun Alliance PLC, and Tapiola General Mutual 
Insurance Company) sued GE Energy in the Mobile County Circuit 
Court. On July 18, 2016, GE Energy, relying on both the New York 
Convention (9 U.S.C. Section 205) and diversity jurisdiction 
(28 U.S.C. § 1332), removed the case to the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Once in federal court, GE Energy, citing the TKS-FLI contract, 
moved to compel arbitration in Germany and dismiss OS’s lawsuit. 
On August 17, 2016, OS and the insurers objected to GE Energy’s 
motion and moved to have the case remanded to state court.
On November 22, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge William 
E. Cassady recommended that OS and the insurers’ motion 
to remand be denied. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. 
Converteam SAS, 2016 WL 7423406 (S.D. Ala. 2016). Judge Cassady 
made no recommendation as to GE Energy’s motion: “What is not 
before the undersigned for decision, and a matter about which the 
undersigned offers no opinion, is GE Energy’s motion to compel 
arbitration and dismiss.”
On December 22, 2016, United States District Judge Kristi K. 
DuBose adopted Judge Cassady’s recommendation to keep the 
case in federal court. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. 
Converteam SAS, 2016 WL 7422675 (S.D. Ala. 2016).
On January 30, 2017, Judge DuBose granted GE Energy’s motion 
to compel OS and its insurer to arbitrate in Germany and dismiss 
their lawsuit. See Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam 
SAS, 2017 WL 401951 (S.D. Ala. 2017). On February 3, 2017, Judge 
DuBose similarly granted GE Energy’s motion to compel OO’s 
insurers to arbitrate in Germany and dismiss their lawsuit. See 
Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam SAS, 2017 WL 480716 
(S.D. Ala. 2017). On March 1, 2017, GE Energy appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
On August 30, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion authored 
by United States District Judge Beth F. Bloom, sitting by 
designation, and joined in by United States Circuit Judges Julie 
E. Carnes and Gerald B. Tjoflat, partially affirmed and partially 
reversed. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 
902 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2018).
Although the panel agreed with Judge DuBose’s decision to deny 
OS and the insurers’ motion to remand, it disagreed with her 
decision to grant GE Energy’s motion to compel arbitration in 
Germany and dismiss OS and the insurers’ lawsuit. On November 
9, 2018, in an unpublished order, the Eleventh Circuit denied 
GE Energy’s motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. On 
February 7, 2019, GE Energy filed a petition for certiorari with the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Meanwhile, on December 7, 2018, OS and the insurers submitted 
a new motion to remand. On March 19, 2019, Judge Cassady 
recommended that it be granted due to the Eleventh Circuit’s 
conclusion that the New York Convention was inapposite. See 
Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. GE Energy SAS, 2019 WL 
2158872, (S.D. Ala. 2019) (“The remaining state-law claims are 
supplemental in nature, and the Court has inherent authority to 
remand them to [the] state court…which will decide the merits 
of the case.”). On April 18, 2019, now Chief Judge DuBose adopted 
Judge Cassady’s recommendation. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, 
LLC v. Converteam SAS, 2019 WL 1748110 (S.D. Ala. 2019).
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On May 17, 2019, GE Energy appealed Chief Judge DuBose’s 
decision to the Eleventh Circuit. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme 
Court granted GE Energy’s petition for certiorari. See GE Energy 
Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, 
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 2776 (2019).
In an unpublished order dated August 1, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit 
refused GE Energy’s request to stay its proceedings “pending 
resolution of GE Energy’s appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court.” 
As a result, briefing on the motion to remand was completed in 
the Eleventh Circuit on November 7, 2019, while briefing on the 
motion to compel arbitration was completed in the Supreme Court 
on November 22, 2019.
CASE ANALYSIS
Ordinarily, an arbitration agreement is enforceable only against 
the parties that have signed it. See United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). However, in 
certain instances a non-party either can compel arbitration or be 
compelled to arbitrate. This is because, as the Court explained in 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009):
Neither [§ 2 nor § 3 of Title 1] purports to alter 
background principles of state contract law regarding 
the scope of agreements (including the question of 
who is bound by them). Indeed § 2 explicitly retains an 
external body of law governing revocation (such grounds 
“as exist at law or in equity”). And we think § 3 adds no 
substantive restriction to § 2’s enforceability mandate. 
“[S]tate law,” therefore, is applicable to determine which 
contracts are binding under § 2 and enforceable under 
§ 3…. Because “traditional principles” of state law allow 
a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the 
contract through “assumption, piercing the corporate 
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party 
beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel,” 21 R. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed.2001), the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding that nonparties to a contract are 
categorically barred from § 3 relief was error.
Id. at 630–31. Thus, if the relevant state law allows it, an 
arbitration agreement can be used by, or applied against, a 
non-party.
Carlisle was a Chapter 1 case, and the Supreme Court has not 
said whether “background contract principles” can be used in a 
Chapter 2 case. In her opinion finding that GE Energy could use 
equitable estoppel—which prevents one party from taking unfair 
advantage of another party—to compel OS and the insurers to 
arbitrate in Germany, Judge DuBose assumed that background 
contract principles can be imported into a Chapter 2 case because 
of Chapter 2’s RAC:
[I]n order for [GE Energy] to be excluded from “Seller” 
or “Party” when referring to “Seller,” or “Parties” 
when referring to both “Seller” and “Buyer,” the Supply 
Agreement must “expressly state[ ] otherwise.” (Id.)
Viewing the Supply Agreements as a whole and 
construing any ambiguities against [TKS] as the drafter, 
the Court finds that the plain language of the arbitration 
provisions[] supports a reasonable interpretation that 
subcontractors are not expressly excluded from the 
meaning of “parties” in the arbitration provisions. There 
is simply no express statement, as required by the Supply 
Agreements, whereby the subcontractors are excluded as 
“Seller” or “parties.”
2017 WL 401951, at *4 (footnotes omitted).
In disagreeing with Judge DuBose’s conclusion, Judge Bloom wrote:
The district court determined that GE Energy and [OS] 
were parties to the Contracts by tracing the definitions 
of “Buyer” and “Seller,” which included subcontractors 
unless explicitly stated otherwise, and the definition 
of “parties” as “Buyer” and “Seller.” Inserting these 
definitions into the arbitration clause, the district court 
found that there was an agreement in writing under the 
meaning of the Convention which required [OS] and GE 
Energy to arbitrate.
However, GE Energy is undeniably not a signatory to 
the Contracts. At the time the Contracts were signed 
by [TKS] and [FLI], GE Energy was a stranger to the 
Contracts and, at most, a potential subcontractor. Private 
parties—here [TKS] and [FLI]—cannot contract around 
the Convention’s requirement that the parties actually 
sign an agreement to arbitrate their disputes in order 
to compel arbitration. New York Convention, Article II, 
¶ 1; see also Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 
F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding sample wording, not 
signed by the parties, did not satisfy the “agreement 
in writing” requirement); Yang [v. Majestic Blue 
Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017)] (finding 
“agreement in writing” requirement not satisfied to 
compel arbitration between a non-signatory company and 
signatory employee). Accordingly, we hold that, to compel 
arbitration, the Convention requires that the arbitration 
agreement be signed by the parties before the Court or 
their privities….
Although parties can compel arbitration through 
estoppel under Chapter 1 of the FAA, estoppel is only 
available under Chapter 1 because Chapter 1 does not 
expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to 
an agreement. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 
U.S. 624, 630–31, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902, 173 L.Ed.2d 
832 (2009). But the Convention imposes precisely 
such a restriction. New York Convention, Article II, ¶ 2 
(requiring that an “agreement in writing” be “signed 
by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams”). Thus, GE Energy cannot compel [OS] to 
arbitrate through estoppel. For this same reason, GE 
Energy also cannot compel arbitration through a third-
party beneficiary theory because, again, the Convention 
requires that the agreement to arbitrate be signed by the 
parties (or exchanged in letters or telegrams).
902 F.3d at 1326–27 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
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As is obvious, Judges DuBose and Bloom read Article II of the New 
York Convention quite differently. In relevant part, it states:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement 
in writing under which the parties undertake to submit 
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen 
or which may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration.
2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an 
arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, 
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of 
letters or telegrams.
As noted by Judge Bloom, the Ninth Circuit (in Yang) also reads 
Article II to preclude importing Chapter 1’s background contract 
principles into a Chapter 2 case. Two other circuits, however, have 
reached the opposite conclusion.
In Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco International, Inc., 526 
F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008), the First Circuit wrote: “The fact that the 
defendants are not signatories is not a basis on which arbitration 
may be denied.”
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has twice held that an arbitration 
clause can apply to a non-party in a Chapter 2 case. In 
International Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen 
GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000), a case with facts remarkably 
like those in the OS-GE Energy dispute, the court explained:
International Paper is estopped from refusing to 
arbitrate its dispute with Schwabedissen. The Wood–
Schwabedissen contract provides part of the factual 
foundation for every claim asserted by International 
Paper against Schwabedissen. In its amended complaint, 
International Paper alleges that Schwabedissen failed 
to honor the warranties in the Wood–Schwabedissen 
contract, and it seeks damages, revocation, and rejection 
“in accordance with” that contract. International 
Paper’s entire case hinges on its asserted rights under 
the Wood–Schwabedissen contract; it cannot seek to 
enforce those contractual rights and avoid the contract’s 
requirement that “any dispute arising out of” the 
contract be arbitrated. The district court did not err in so 
holding.
Id. at 418.
More recently, in Aggarao v. MOL Ship Management Co., 675 F.3d 
355 (4th Cir. 2012), the Fourth Circuit decided that using equitable 
estoppel in a Chapter 2 case is appropriate where the claims 
against both the defendant that signed the arbitration agreement 
and the defendant that did not are “based on the same facts,” 
are “inherently inseparable,” and “fall within the scope of the 
arbitration clause.”
SIGNIFICANCE
On its face, Article II is quite clear: only the actual parties to 
an arbitration agreement are bound by it and entitled to take 
advantage of it. Thus, if the Supreme Court decides to read the 
Convention literally, OS and the insurers should prevail.
On the other hand, if the Court takes a more liberal view of 
Article II’s language, then it should have no trouble finding for 
GE Energy. In its amicus brief, the United States believes this is 
the correct approach, especially given how other countries are 
interpreting Article II:
For example, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland 
recently rejected the argument that Article II of the 
Convention prohibits a nonsignatory from enforcing an 
arbitration agreement. See Bundesgericht [BGer], Case 
No. 4A_646/2018 (Apr. 17, 2019), ¶ 2.4….
Courts in other Contracting States likewise have 
concluded that the Convention’s form provisions in 
Article II do not bar application of domestic-law doctrines 
that govern when a nonsignatory may invoke or be 
bound by an arbitration agreement. See, for example, 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], 
Case No. III ZR 371/12 (May 8, 2014)…(decision by the 
German Federal Court of Justice concluding that the 
form provisions in Article II would not prevent applying 
an arbitration clause to a nonsignatory under domestic 
law doctrines); Phillippe Pinsole, A French View on 
the Application of the Arbitration Agreement to Non-
signatories, in The Evolution and Future of International 
Arbitration (Stavros Brekoulakis et al. eds., 2016) ¶ 
12.33, at 214 (providing English translation of Paris 
Court of appeal cases)….
Id. at 26–28.
In their joint reply brief, OS and the insurers dispute that foreign 
countries (particularly Germany) recognize equitable estoppel, 
which they describe as a “unique” U.S. doctrine.
Other amici supporting GE Energy take a different tack. In 
their view, a decision to read the Convention strictly will make 
international arbitration less attractive. For example, the Miami 
International Arbitration Society predicts this will occur because
[i]nternational transactions often involve multiple 
parties, subsidiaries, and subcontractors, each with their 
own contracts and agreements. It would be impossible for 
parties to extend arbitration agreements to include every 
potential party as a signatory. The Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision suppresses efficient international contracting by 
imposing such a requirement on agreements subject to 
the Convention. Should this Court affirm, international 
arbitration would lose favor as a viable dispute resolution 
mechanism.
Id. at 21. 
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In their joint reply brief, OS and the insurers argue that the exact 
opposite is true: “[B]y expanding a party’s arbitration obligations 
beyond the scope of the consent expressed in its written 
arbitration agreement, GE France’s position would undermine 
incentives to enter such agreements in the first place.” Id. at 49.
As amicus supporting OS and the insurers, the Public Citizen 
Litigation Group, a consumer advocacy organization, makes the 
same point:
Invocation of federal policy supporting arbitration 
of international disputes cannot justify expanding 
the Convention’s scope beyond what its terms allow. 
Federal policy favors arbitration only where parties 
have consented to it. Adhering to the plain terms of 
the Convention comports with that policy. By contrast, 
importing expansive notions of equitable estoppel 
into the Convention threatens to force international 
businesses, as well as American workers and consumers, 
to resolve grievances before foreign tribunals in the 
absence of their consent to do so.
Id. at 2–3.
Public Justice, P.C., a national public interest law firm supporting 
neither OS and the insurers nor GE Energy, has urged the Court to 
focus on what it sees as a more pressing issue:
But the question of whether Chapters 1 and 2 of the 
FAA provide the same rights to nonsignatories sidesteps 
an even more fundamental question: what is meant by 
the “doctrine of equitable estoppel”? That foundational 
question should not linger in the shadows of this 
Court’s opinion in this case; the Court should address it 
directly.…
Traditionally, equitable estoppel was a defense that 
prevented one party from taking unfair advantage of 
another by making false representations on which 
the other party detrimentally relied…. Yet [in] 
arbitration [cases, U.S. courts now] require neither 
detrimental reliance by the nonsignatory seeking 
estoppel nor a misrepresentation by the plaintiff that 
the nonsignatory seeks to estop…. Thus the continued 
use of these doctrines, both in state and federal courts, 
is inconsistent with Chapter 1 of the FAA…[and t]his 
Court should say so expressly now, before the confusion 
in the law grows any deeper.
Id. at 2–4.
Despite their erudition, the parties and amici all ignore (perhaps 
purposefully) the two questions they should be asking: why is GE 
Energy, the subsidiary of a United States company, so eager to 
arbitrate in Germany? Alternatively, why is OS, the subsidiary of 
a Finnish company, so eager to litigate in the United States? The 
answer to both questions, of course, is that an Alabama jury is 
likely to award much greater damages than a German arbitration 
panel.
Thus, at the end of the day, what this case really is about is 
international forum shopping, a subject the Court knows well 
and a strategy it repeatedly has refused to countenance. See, for 
example, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 
U.S. 528 (1995) (rejecting attempt to avoid arbitration in Japan); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 
(1985) (same); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) 
(rejecting attempt to avoid arbitration in France); The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (rejecting attempt to avoid 
litigation in England). 
Robert M. Jarvis is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern 
University and a past member of the advisory board of the 
World Arbitration and Mediation Report. He can be reached at 
jarvisb@nova.edu or 954.873.9173. 
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